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Abstract—SRAM-based FPGAs are becoming increasingly at-
tractive for use in space applications due to their reconfigurability
and signal processing capabilities, as well as their increasing
speed and capacity. Traditional SRAM-based FPGAs, however,
are highly sensitive to the ionizing radiation environment in
space, making them prone to radiation-induced memory upsets.
In this paper, we evaluate and compare scrubbing techniques for
Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs with respect to radiation-induced
single event upsets. A test framework using an exchangeable
payload is developed for this purpose and run on a Xilinx Virtex-5
FPGA. We show that recent SRAM-based FPGAs can constitute a
cost-efficient alternative to radiation-hardened or antifuse FPGAs
for non-critical space application such as satellite instruments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The reprogrammable and reconfigurable capabilities of
SRAM-based FPGAs, along with their suitability for signal
processing applications and their increasing capacity, have
made them increasingly attractive as alternatives to ASICs in
space applications. Compared to radiation-hardened proces-
sors conventionally used, FPGAs constitute a highly versatile
and high-performing alternative, especially considering their
reprogrammability and great capability for parallelisation.
Operating in a space environment raises a number of issues
that affect the design of a system, e.g., radiation can negatively
impact the lifespan, performance and reliability of a digital
system [1], [2]. As more advanced process nodes with smaller
geometries are introduced, designing for fault tolerance is
becoming an increasingly important aspect.
Traditionally, the space industry has avoided commercial
off-the-shelf SRAM-based FPGAs due to the susceptibility
of their configuration memory to radiation-induced bit up-
sets when subjected to the ionizing radiation environment in
space. However, it is no longer feasible to disregard SRAM-
based FPGA technology, especially when considering the
high non-recurring engineering costs involved in developing
custom ASIC designs, and the low production volumes typ-
ical of space applications. While alternatives such as flash-
or antifuse-based FPGAs exist, these are less flexible and
generally much smaller than their SRAM-based counterparts.
There are also radiation-hardened versions of SRAM-based
FPGAs available on the market, which have been proven in
space missions. These, however, are generally far behind in
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performance and capacity compared to standard off-the-shelf
FPGAs, as well as being overly expensive for many projects.
While it is true that SRAM-based FPGAs are sensitive to
radiation-induced upsets in both their configuration and user
memory [1], it is important to acknowledge that satellite FPGA
applications range from instruments with relaxed timing and
availability requirements, all the way up to mission-critical
systems, requiring different levels of fault tolerance. The aim
of this work is to investigate the feasibility of using Xilinx’s
SRAM-based FPGAs with triple modular redundancy (TMR)
and scrubbing techniques for space applications.
II. RELATED WORK
Significant work on the subject has been done by the
NASA Radiation Effects and Analysis Group and by Gaisler
Research. As far as available soft-error mitigation techniques,
prior studies have resulted in short [3] and more extensive [4]
overviews of techniques that are possible to deploy. Sari
and Psarakis presented a configuration-memory sensitivity
analysis for a typical FPGA application with a soft-core
processor [5]. Configuration-memory scrubbing is a well-
explored area, and various scrubbing implementations have
been introduced [6], [7]. Berg et al. compared external scrub-
ber implementations with scrubber implementations internally
on the FPGA [8]. Several previous papers have investigated
TMR-implementation techniques for FPGAs, such as partial
TMR or fine-grained TMR [9], [10], [11]. In their 2014 paper,
Glein et al. present a method of using BRAM as radiation-
level indicators [12]. Xilinx provide SEU-mitigation guideline
documents [13], [14] as well as soft-error mitigation IP cores
for Virtex series FPGAs [15], [16]. Xilinx’s IDF and IVT
tools can be applied to partition FPGA designs into logically
isolated blocks and to verify designs for fault tolerance.
III. METHOD
A. Test Platform
In order to test and evaluate mitigation techniques, a test
platform has been implemented. In designing the test platform,
a few basic functions were identified. A platform needs to pro-
vide 1) reliable fault injection, 2) fault detection and logging,
and 3) an exchangeable payload. Both the test framework and
the payload are implemented on the same FPGA. By keeping
the payload logically separate from the test framework, it can
be easily exchanged. Furthermore, testing was facilitated by
moving complexity from the FPGA to software on a host PC
wherever possible.
The hardware platform is implemented on a Virtex-5
XC5VLX50-ff676 (-1) evaluation board. The Virtex-5 plat-
form is chosen as it represents a realistic choice of FPGA for
space applications, and there is a radiation-hardened version
of the Virtex-5 on the market. Architecturally the FPGA
test platform consists of three main parts: A bus structure,
a test framework, and the payload itself (the device-under-
test). A framework block diagram is given in Figure 1. The
bus structure is used to provide DMA and configuration-
register access. The test-framework block is made up of
the SEU Controller, which is managing fault injection, the
Fault Monitor, which is providing result checking and error
logging, and the Reconfiguration Manager, which manages
configuration-memory scrubbing in the cases where it is used.
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of FPGA test platform
The SEU Controller [15] is a soft-error-mitigation core
provided by Xilinx. It implements SECDED functionality and
fault injection capability through the use of the Frame ECC
and ICAP primitives. Faults are injected by single bit flips in
memory frames, accessed through ICAP. An UART interface
enables communication with a PC through a set of commands
and responses. The SEU Controller is able to detect and correct
(single-bit) configuration-memory errors. It can also detect, but
not correct, multi-bit errors.
The Fault Monitor provides an interface to the payload. An
UART interface (separate from the SEU Controller) provides
communication with the host PC. The set of commands
interpreted by the Fault Monitor is separate from the set of
commands for the SEU Controller. Application-specific test
vectors are kept by the Fault Monitor and used as input
to the payload. The result vectors produced by the payload
application are compared to the expected output vectors. The
Fault Monitor then stores a status vector to memory, indicating
any errors detected in the payload output. Status vectors can
be stored to off-chip flash memory or internally to BRAM,
and retrieved via the UART channel. Minimising connections
between the Fault Monitor and the payload ensures a good
level of logical separation.
The Reconfiguration Manager manages configuration-
memory scrubbing through the ICAP interface and interfaces
to an off-chip platform Flash or EEPROM, which stores the
reference bitstream. By placing the Reconfiguration Manager
outside or inside the payload block of the test platform, it is
possible to model an external or internal scrubber, respectively.
As ICAP is used by both the SEU Controller and the Re-
configuration Manager, an ICAP controller is used to provide
arbitration. ICAP is clocked using the system’s master clock.
The payload is placed in a separate p-block, in a known
frame interval in the configuration memory, using Xilinx
PlanAhead. We do not make use of the Xilinx Essential Bits
classification scheme. This allows logic separation between
payload and framework, as well as a known range of frames in
which to inject errors without risking upsetting configuration
bits in the framework. PlanAhead produces a logic alloca-
tion (.ll) file containing information about the frame address
mapping. We use this mapping when injecting faults in the
payload.
B. Host PC Software
A Tcl application run on a host PC manages all test se-
quences through commands sent over UART to the test frame-
work. To realistically simulate randomly occurring SEUs, a
MATLAB program on the host PC is used in conjunction with
an orbit profile to generate a sequence of SEU injections, based
on the CREME96 model.
Two types of tests are used; isolation testing and continuous
testing. In isolation testing, single-bit upsets are tested as
isolated events. A single fault is randomly injected in the
payload’s configuration. The Fault Monitor then runs and
checks a large number of test vectors, offering a good coverage
of the payload application and minimising the risk of a fault
going undetected. An error is logged, indicating what instance
failed, when one or more of the test vectors cause the payload
to produce an incorrect result. The fault is corrected before the
next one is injected. This type of testing is useful for evaluating
the masking capabilities of an SEU mitigation technique such
as TMR. Each test run comprises 4,000 injected faults.
In continuous tests, errors are not corrected between each
fault insertion. This allows the analysis of dynamic processes,
such as error build-up, and the effect of scrubbing. From
continuous testing, numbers for availability, Mean Time To
Failure (MTTF), and performance over time can be obtained.
A MATLAB script on the host PC is used to analyse the PC-
to-FPGA communication logs to extract these statistics.
C. TMR Variants
Four TMR variants have been implemented, based on a
thoroughly verified 128-bit AES-encryption block. The AES
application was chosen because of the extensive documenta-
tion available on AES and because errors anywhere in the
encryption chain are likely to propagate to the output. A large
number of test vectors are available for the AES standard.
We make use of the NIST AES Known Answer Test (KAT)
Vectors [17]. The AES application used here does not make
use of BRAM or DSP blocks. The different tested TMR
variants are listed below.
1) Reference: A baseline payload without TMR.
2) Single Voter TMR: Module-level TMR with a single voter.
3) Triple Voter TMR: Module-level TMR where the voter is
tripled.
4) Synplify TMR: TMR is applied using Synplify Premier.
D. Scrubbing Methods
1) Blind Scrubbing: This corresponds to a periodical, full-
reconfiguration scrubbing which is based on an internal
counter in the FPGA.
2) CRC-based Scrubbing: This type of scrubber performs
a full reconfiguration upon detecting an error in the
configuration-memory CRC. CRC error checking is done
as a background task through the SEU Controller.
3) Frame ECC-Based Scrubbing: Using Frame-level ECC
to detect errors, allowing single frames to be scrubbed using
dynamic partial reconfiguration.
4) SECDED Scrubbing: This combination scrubbing makes
use of the SEU Controller for correcting single bits, using
SEU Controller’s SECDED bit-toggling functionality. If a
multi-bit error occurs, or if the SEU Controller is not able
to correct an error, a full reconfiguration is triggered.
IV. RESULTS
Table IV presents a summary of the isolation-testing results,
giving an indication of how well the different TMR variants
can mask errors. Each test comprises 4,000 injected faults, and
a breakdown of the observed error types is made. A single
error is defined as an error affecting the output of a single
TMR branch. A bridge error is a single error that affects two
separate TMR branches. We note that the single voter design
has more failures, while the triple-voter design and Synplify-
applied TMR perform roughly equally.
TABLE I
ISOLATION TESTING RESULTS FOR TMR
Errors Single Bridge Voter Failures (%)
Reference 1084 1084 - - 1084 (27.1)
Single Voter 697 663 14 20 34 (0.85)
Triple Voter 714 674 8 32 14 (0.35)
Synplify TMR 101 10 - - 10 (0.25)
1Synplify TMR has lower observability
Considering the resources used for each of the TMR
variants, Table IV shows the relative resource usage on an
XC5VLX50 FPGA. The designs are synthesised using Syn-
plify Premier (H-2013.03).
TABLE II
FPGA RESOURCE USAGE FOR TMR VARIANTS
Slices Regs LUTs LUT-DFF Pairs Rel.
Reference 291 408 1143 1143 1
Single Voter 1354 1345 3698 3698 3.24x
Triple Voter 1472 1603 4224 4224 3.87x
Synplify TMR 2275 1224 5436 5436 4.76x
Having a sense of the error-masking capabilities and the
resource cost of the TMR variants, we move on to study
the dynamic behaviour. For the purpose of evaluating blind
scrubbing, the SEU rate (rate of fault-injections into the
payload) and the scrubbing rate are varied. Figure 2 shows
the resulting availability for systems using a blind-scrubbing
approach for each of the TMR variants and the baseline. The
SEU and scrubbing rates are varied to show their relation. The
SEU period (1/fSEU ) is given in seconds, and the scrubbing
rates in average number of reconfigurations per SEU. The bold
line marks the maximum availability for each SEU scrubbing
rate.
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Fig. 2. Availability results for blind scrubbing implementations
It should be noted that a short SEU period combined with a
high scrubbing rate results in very low availability. The system
will be unavailable while it is reconfiguring. If the scrubbing
rate is too high, the system will be busy with reconfiguration
most of the time, leading to lower availability. Reconfiguration
takes a certain amount of time regardless of the design, on our
Virtex-5 approximately 500 ms. Figure 2 shows that scrubbing
too infrequently or too often in relation to the expected SEU
rate leads to lower availability when using blind scrubbing.
The detection-based scrubbing methods tested provide a faster
response time to errors compared to blind scrubbing.
Two realistic example scenarios were investigated: a) an 800-
km, 98◦inclination LEO and b) a -55◦longitude GEO. Since no
radiation testing results are available from the manufacturer for
the XC5VLX50 FPGA used here, calculations will be made
using the device characteristics published for another Virtex-
5 series FPGA, the radiation-hardened Virtex-5QV FX130T
(XQR5VFX130T) [18]. The test application is the same 128-
bit AES application used in the previous tests, but scaled up to
fill the entire FPGA. Table IV indicates how many functional
D-flip-flops can fit in the FPGA for each TMR variant.
TABLE III
TEST APPLICATION RESOURCES
TMR Functional DFFs AES Blocks Device Usage
Reference 28,968 71 99.1%
Single Voter 8,976 22 99.3%
Triple Voter 7,752 19 98.0%
Synplify TMR 6,120 15 99.5%
The purpose of scaling the application to fill as much of the
FPGA as possible is that for a fixed number of injected faults,
TMR variants with lower resource usage would otherwise
experience a higher density of faults.
For space applications, considering MTTF or Failures-In-
Time (FIT) is often more relevant than availability. FIT is a
measurement of the number of failures in 109 hours. Figure 3
shows MTTF for our detection-based scrubbers (CRC, Frame-
ECC and SECDED-based). We found that MTTF has a linear
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Fig. 3. Mean-time-to-failure for detection-based scrubbers
dependence on the SEU period. When comparing Frame-ECC-
triggered scrubbing with CRC-triggered scrubbing, it is ap-
parent that the triple-voter and Synplify TMR variants benefit
more from having frame-level reconfigurability or SECDED
than does single-voter TMR. The triple-voter and Synplify-
TMR variants both have tripled voters, meaning that one of
the voters can be down for reconfiguration while the other
two still function, when using frame-level reconfiguration or
SECDED.
Calculating the radiation profiles from the orbit parameters
and using the characteristics for the XQR5VFX130T, we
extrapolate the results to assess the performance for the LEO
and GEO examples, as shown in Figure 4. For a realistic
estimate, we have included 5% of the available BRAM on the
FPGA. This is done to show the impact of BRAM on the error
rate. The resulting FIT values for LEO and GEO for the TMR
payload are in the order of 105. The top performing techniques
are triple-voter or Synplify TMR combined with SECDED
or Frame-ECC based scrubbing. For LEO, FIT values are
{1.3356, 1.0701, 1.2857, 1.0351} ∗ 105, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Failures in time for example Virtex-5 application in LEO and GEO
V. CONCLUSION
The results presented in this paper suggest that standard,
commercial SRAM-based FPGAs from Xilinx can indeed be
used in some space applications. For suitable applications,
such as non-critical instruments or communications, SRAM-
based FPGAs can provide a very cost-to-area-efficient alter-
native. TMR needs to be combined with scrubbing in order
to be efficient, or it will eventually suffer from error build-
up. The results presented here apply to the selected test
application, i.e., the 128-bit AES block. While the techniques
discussed are general, the results will vary depending on the
application. Applications with natural downtime windows can
benefit from simple periodic scrubbing. Partial-reconfiguration
in conjunction with TMR constitutes a very efficient fault-
tolerance alternative, but there is significant resource overhead.
The SECDED alternative based on the Xilinx SEU Controller
represents a resource-efficient choice that can be combined
with externally-triggered full reconfiguration. The example
LEO and GEO scenarios discussed in this paper show that
commercial SRAM-based FPGAs can be used in space appli-
cations, but both user data and configuration memory have to
be protected.
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